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Abstract 
The permanent removal of data from computer disks has always been problematic.  This has been due, in part, to 
the lack of availability of tools, and in part due to the misperception by the user that when a file is deleted it is 
destroyed and cannot be recovered and that when a disk is formatted, the data is destroyed. In this paper, we 
examine a number of the commonly available tools to determine how effectively they function and whether they 
achieve the aim of the effective destruction of data 
Keywords 
Disk file erasure tools  
INTRODUCTION 
Today, computer users have the ability and the need to store vast quantities of digital data. Terabyte computer 
drives are small and affordable and increasingly found in both the commercial and the home environment. 
Individuals and organizations are quick to fill these drives with images, movies, personal, corporate and 
customer data. But devices and the drives they contain are regularly sold, lost or stolen. Data often has a limited 
useful lifespan, after which its possession is a liability. The actions to remove data that are performed by the 
operating system are limited to freeing up space on the disk, not ensuring the data cannot be recovered. 
A variety of products exist that claim to perform the secure deletion of data. These can either target individual 
files/folders or entire drives. A number of standards exist, the most common being US DoD 5220.22-M(E), and 
most of the standards use multiple overwrites to ensure that all data is overwritten and as a result cannot be 
recovered. An experiment was created to put 12 of the better known products to the test. The aim of the 
experiment was primarily to see if the data on the disk was erased correctly, but also to compare performance 
and determine if there were any identifying artefacts left by the individual processes. 
PREVIOUS WORK 
The study of secure data deletion was first started in (M.Slusarczuk et al, 1987). In (Gutmann, 1996), Gutmann 
argued that imprecise writing of data can mean that remnants of data remain upon overwriting. Normal disk 
circuitry is set up to ignore such variations, but more sophisticated equipment (such as magnetic force 
microscopy) could recover data even after it had been overwritten several times. He proposed a system of 
overwrites to make any such recovery impossible. Depending on which encoding is used, or if this is even 
known, the process takes between 10 and 35 overwrites.  
(Wright & Kleiman, 2008) called into question some of the conclusions of Gutmann’s work. From their 
experiments, they found that even a single overwrite can make recovery difficult. While individual bits may be 
recovered, the collection of large amounts of data is infeasible. This is due to the track density of disks, the 
history of multiple overwrites typical in most disks that are not pristine, and a number of other factors. 
There are many different standards that deal with the secure deletion of data. These include: (Defense, 2006), 
(Richard Kissel, 2006), (DSD, 2008), (CESG), (CSEC, 2006), (NZSIT, 2008). 
METHODOLOGY 
The first step in the process was to create the baseline dataset - a collection of files that would be present on the 
disk before each eraser tool was used. The disk that was to be used in the experiment was 80GB in size 
(80,026,361,856 bytes). A variety of files to fill this disk was obtained from a number of locations, including 
Linux distributions (http://www.linux.com/directory/Distributions), documents from Project Gutenberg 
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(http://www.gutenberg.org/wiki/Main_Page), audio and video podcasts (http://revision3.com/), etc. A 
breakdown of the file types is given in Table 1. 
 
Table 6 Contents of dataset by file type 
 Number 
of files 
Size of files 
(bytes) 
% files % size 
.zip 34,175 7,840,054,030 23.95% 10.69% 
.txt 32,658 12,485,041,529 22.89% 17.03% 
.html/htm 32,556 997,986,644 22.82% 1.36% 
.jpg 29,273 2,233,242,253 20.52% 3.05% 
.png 9,671 332,134,802 6.78% 0.45% 
.gif 3,171 57,848,611 2.22% 0.08% 
.mp3 353 6,036,455,322 0.25% 8.23% 
.jpeg 172 39,837,374 0.12% 0.05% 
.pdf 153 24,977,994 0.11% 0.03% 
.avi 43 4,468,614,994 0.03% 6.10% 
.iso 13 34,656,677,888 0.01% 47.27% 
.mov 5 3,083,433,409 0.00% 4.21% 
.img 1 948,244,480 0.00% 1.29% 
rest 434 105,952,541 0.30% 0.14% 
Total 142,678 73,310,501,871 100.00% 100.00% 
Tools 
Prior to each individual experiment, the drive was erased using the Wipe Drive feature of FTK 3.2, the files were 
copied to the drive and an image taken (the disk was also imaged after the erasure for manual inspection and 
verification). Several tools were used in the analysis of each eraser. 
 FTK  
 Md5deep 
 Scalpel  
 Cmp 
 Grep, scripts, batch files, custom written code and OS commands 
FTK (http://accessdata.com/products/computer-forensics/ftk) is a commonly used forensics tool. As well as 
providing an initial view of hard disk images, it displays all files remaining, and provides searching and carving 
features. 
Md5deep (http://md5deep.sourceforge.net/) is a command-line tool that allows MD5 digests to be taken 
recursively of all files within a given target directory, including the contents of all subdirectories. The .iso 
images were mounted and digests of the contained files taken, but the same was not necessary for the .zip files as 
these were already part of the dataset. 
Scalpel (http://www.digitalforensicssolutions.com/Scalpel/) is a configurable tool for searching images for files 
and file fragments based on known file header/footer strings. For this experiment, Scalpel was configured to 
search for the following filetypes: gif, jpg, mpg, doc, dbx, idx, mbx, htm, pdf, pgd, wav and zip. Scalpel can 
search for other filetypes, but the list was constrained to decrease the number of false-positives (otherwise each 
execution would have created 100s of GB in false files based on coincidental matches). Notice that some of the 
searched for filetypes were not present in the dataset. These were included to give an idea on the rates of false-
positives and to determine if any of the erasers were deliberately placing fake files on the disk as part of the 
erasing process. Version 1.6 of Scalpel was used in this experiment. 
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Cmp (http://www.gnu.org/software/diffutils/) is a command-line tool to compare two files and list all the 
differences byte-by-byte. 
Grep is a command-line tool for searching files. 
Several scripts and batch files were used over the course of the experiment. During each experiment, one batch 
file periodically executed the “tasklist” command to obtain the memory and CPU usage of the erasing tool. 
Nonzero.exe is a custom C++ program specifically written for this experiment. Many erasing tools will 
overwrite the data with a series of \x00 values (as the final pass where there are multiple overwrites). While this 
may seem to cover the complete drive, the human eye cannot hope to verify this. Nonzero scans the raw image 
data for any sequence of non-zero byte values (or any that deviates from a known pattern). 
Each tool was evaluated in the exact same manner by repeating the same steps: 
1. The dataset image was restored to the disk 
2. A batch file was configured to capture the memory and CPU usage of the tool 
3. The erasing tool was run using the 3-pass DoD standard (if available) and all other default settings on 
the entire drive/all files contained in the drive 
4. Once the erasing tool completing its cycle, the disk was disconnected 
5. The disk was connected via a write-blocker (Tableau Ultrablock II) and imaged (using AccessData FTK 
imager 2.7.0.33) 
6. The image was imported to FTK for manual analysis (mainly looking for any obvious directory names, 
file names or recovered files) 
7. The list of all files that FTK recovered was exported and their MD5 digest compared with the original 
dataset 
8. The raw image was exported and scalpel run to carve known filetypes 
9. The MD5 digests of all carved files were taken and compared to the dataset 
10. If the drive appeared to be all \x00 (or a simple repeating pattern), nonzero.exe was run to confirm 
this/find any changes in the pattern 
To elaborate on steps 7 and 9, significant use was made of md5deep. The MD5 digests of the dataset were stored 
in a text file, with each line containing the digest then the complete file path and name. This file was sorted. In 
steps 7 and 9, files were generated that may have come from the original dataset or may be random files. FTK 
automatically creates hash digests of all files identified, this was exported to a text file (again with the MD5 
digest first and the file sorted). For the Scalpel generated files, md5deep was again used (and the file with the 
digests sorted). A perl script was then run to look for matches in the FTK/Scalpel generated files digests with the 
digests from the original dataset (matching is much easier and more efficient when the files are sorted by 
digests). As well as comparing the files using the digests, a sample of the carved files were manually inspected to 
check if any files were partially recovered, or if there were any discrepancies between the carved files and the 
originals. 
ERASERS 
In Table 2, a summary is provided of the 12 erasers selected for the experiment. The details given are the eraser 
name, type (i.e. disk or file eraser), version number and overwriting standard used. The final two columns relate 
to the driving force behind the creation of the tool. A distinction is made between not-for-profit (NFP) tools 
created by hobbyists/open source community and tools that are commercial (the tool itself is free but used to 
promote full version products or related services). 
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Table 7 Summary of tested Erasing tools 
 Name Type Version Standard License Other interests/products 
1 Active @ 
KillDisk 
Disk 5.2.3 Single pass Commercial Data recovery software + 
services, CD/DVD burner tools 
2 BCWipe File 4.01.23 DoD 5220.22 Commercial Wipers for Unix, whole disk 
erasers, BestCrypt encryption 
tools 
3 Blancco Disk 4.1 DoD 5220.22 Commercial Data erasure tools for PCs, 
servers, mobile 
 devices and flash media 
4 CBLData 
Shredder 
Disk 1.0e DoD 5220.22 Commercial Data recovery from different 
media: hard drive, RAID, tape, 
laptop, zip/floppy drive, flash 
cards, etc. 
5 DBAN Disk 2.2.6 DoD 5220.22 NFP Open source project on 
Sourceforge 
6 DPWiper File 1.1 DoD 5220.22 NFP Personal project 
7 Eraser File 6.0.8.227
3 
DoD 5220.22 Commercial Browser history eraser, multi-
application server package, 
SPAM blocker and a .NET web 
farm clustering synchronization 
tool 
8 File 
Eraser 
File 5.7 DoD 5220.22 NFP Startup manager tool 
9 File 
Shredder 
File 2.0 DoD 5220.22 NFP Anti-virus, anti-forensics, 
privacy protection/password 
management tools. 
10 Freeraser File 1.0.0.23 DoD 5220.22 Commercial Portable applications for USB 
drives 
11 HardDrive 
Eraser 
Disk 2.0 DoD 5220.22 NFP Personal project 
12 Wipetool Disk 2.35 build 
1178 
Unknown Commercial Hard disk diagnostics and 
recovery utilities 
ANALYSIS 
Table 3 has a summary of the analysis done using FTK and Scalpel. The rest of this section comprises of a 
discussion of the meaning and significance of these results. 
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Table 8 Results from analysis of Erased disks 
Tool FTK 
Folder 
names 
FTK 
Filenames 
FTK files 
recovered 
FTK file 
matches 
Overwrite 
pattern 
Scalpel 
Files 
MD5 
matches 
Partial 
matches 
Active @ 
Kill Disk 
None None None None All zeros None None None 
BCWipe Some None 28,326 None Random 170 1 None 
Blancco None None (15) None "B5" 
repeating 
None None None 
CBLData 
Shredder 
None None None None Random 60 None None 
DBAN None None None None All zeros None None None 
DPWiper None None 91 6 Random 126 None None 
Eraser Most None 3,255 6 Random 40 None None 
Fileeraser None None 3,075 6 Random 6333 94 None 
File 
Shredder 
Most None 145,695 6 Random 59 None None 
Freeraser Most Most 145,687 6 Random 12 None None 
Hard 
Drive 
Eraser 
None None 58 None 1kb 
repeating 
34 None 9 
Wipetool None None None None All zeros None None None 
Proven Erasure 
Some tools overwrote the disk with a random pattern, while others used a fixed, repeating pattern. Where it 
seemed to be the latter, one of the custom-written tools was used to verify this. In the case of confirmation, no 
further analysis would be strictly necessary. It is impossible to recover any files from direct reading of an image 
that is 100% \x00 bytes (however, all steps were taken on all images for consistency).  
The images resulting from Active @ Kill Disk, DBAN and Wipetool were all confirmed to consist entirely of 
\x00 bytes. The Blancco image consisted almost entirely of \xB5 bytes, the remaining 0.09% did not yield any 
interesting material, and none of the 15 files recovered by FTK matched any in the dataset. 
Successful Erasure 
No information about the original dataset was successfully recovered from the CBLDataShredder image. It did 
not have a repeating pattern that could be verified, but neither FTK nor Scalpel recovered any of the original 
data. Since none of the 60 files carved by Scalpel matched the dataset and a visual inspection did not reveal any 
matches, they can be assumed to be random coincidence, which is to be expected given the size of the drive. No 
argument is being made regarding the merit of fixed overwrites over random (or vice versa) in the last pass, there 
is merely a difference in what can be proven. 
System Volume Information Files 
FTK recovered the same 6 files from each images of DPWiper, Eraser, File Shredder and Freeraser (see Table 4 
for the DPWiper files). Before discussing the significance of these results, it is necessary to cover some relevant 
aspects of probability. Given the problem of studying disks that (for the most part) are overwritten with random 
data, and looking for matches with the original files (of which there are great many), the possibility has to be 
considered that the original files may be coincidentally recreated. It can be shown that the length of the file is the 
important parameter in determining the likelihood of accidental matching. If this length is significantly greater 
than 10 bytes, then the probability of this occurring rapidly approaches zero. This means that the matches found 
are almost certainly recovery of the original files rather than coincidental recreations (the smallest file is 15 
bytes). 
Having shown that the files were recovered due to a failing in the erasure, the question is now how it happened. 
The answer is most likely related to the location of the recovered files, they were all originally present in the 
System Volume Information folder (not just in the case of DPWiper, but with the other three erasers as well). 
This folder is used by the Operating System to recover system files in the case of errors or crashes. It is typically 
unavailable to the user or running applications. This explains why erasing programs would have a problem 
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erasing these files completely (note that all four were file erasers rather than disk erasers). It also somewhat 
reduces the impact this might have on users relying on file erasers. Not every filetype may be saved in the 
System Volume Information folder. Batch files, icons and readme files were recovered, which are not generally 
used to store sensitive information. However, for secure use it would be important to know exactly what was 
saved in the System Volume Information folder (or to disable this functionality) before one could confidently 
use any of DPWiper, Eraser, File Shredder and Freeraser. 
 
Table 9 Files recovered from DPWiper Image by FTK 
FTK name FTK Location Dataset Offset Size 
(bytes) 
1 A0016112.INF [root]/System Volume 
Information/_restore{DD0CF2F7-
77D2-4945-B346-
6B5613DA5B5D}/RP56/ 
E:\Dataset\Documents\ 
AUTORUN.INF 
C001C720 88 
2 A0016113.bat [root]/System Volume 
Information/_restore{DD0CF2F7-
77D2-4945-B346-
6B5613DA5B5D}/RP56/ 
E:\Dataset\Documents\ 
re_unzip.bat 
C001CB28 117 
3 A0016114.LCK [root]/System Volume 
Information/_restore{DD0CF2F7-
77D2-4945-B346-
6B5613DA5B5D}/RP56/ 
E:\Dataset\Documents\ 
ETEXT02\8lied10.zip.LCK 
C001CF28 15 
4 A0016115.me [root]/System Volume 
Information/_restore{DD0CF2F7-
77D2-4945-B346-
6B5613DA5B5D}/RP56/ 
E:\Dataset\Documents\ 
ETEXT94\read116.me 
BBED3E00 11,163 
5 A0016116.me [root]/System Volume 
Information/_restore{DD0CF2F7-
77D2-4945-B346-
6B5613DA5B5D}/RP56/ 
E:\Dataset\Documents\ 
ETEXT94\read728.me 
BBED6E00 9,789 
6 A0016117.ICO [root]/System Volume 
Information/_restore{DD0CF2F7-
77D2-4945-B346-
6B5613DA5B5D}/RP56/ 
E:\Dataset\Documents\ 
IMAGES\FAVICON.ICO 
BBEE7E00 1,150 
In terms of information about the files and folders, only DPWiper managed to successfully erase both. The entire 
directory structure appeared to be intact in the Eraser and File Shredder images, and the Freeraser image had the 
original file names as well. 
Arbitrary Files 
Finally, there are the worst offenders, the tools that permitted the recovery of apparently arbitrary files. First is 
BCWipe. As well as FTK recovering the directory structure, Scalpel carved 17 files. This number on its own is 
not significant, however, the subsequent comparison of the digests showed that one of the 17 files matched with 
a file from the dataset, specifically, E:\Dataset\Documents\IMAGES\BUTTONBKG.JPG. This is a small, white 
rectangle image, only 313 bytes in size. It is difficult to imagine a situation where such a file would be 
significant, but the recovery of a single file, byte-for-byte perfectly recreated, casts into doubt the entire value of 
the erasing tool.  
Second is Fileeraser. FTK recovered the same six files as from the tools in the previous section. Scalpel carved 
6333 files, of which there were initially no matches from the dataset. However, manual analysis showed that 
while there were a great many invalid files (.zip and .mpg), there were several legible files (mainly .html). From 
examining the contents of the html files, it became clear that they were from the .iso images (specifically the 
Slackware installation disk). The .iso images from the dataset were mounted using VirtualCloneDrive 
(http://www.slysoft.com/en/virtual-clonedrive.html) and MD5 digests were taken of all the files. When these 
digests were added to the MD5 list, it was found that of the 6333 files Scalpel carved, an astonishing 94 matched 
the dataset, 92 .html files and 2 .jpg. The files are relatively small in size, a few kilobytes, but easily long enough 
to rule out coincidence. 
Lastly is Hard Drive Eraser. The image appeared to be a continuous repetition of a 1KB pattern. Scalpel carved 
34 files from the image, none of which matched the files from the dataset. As mentioned previously, random 
samples from the carved files were checked in all experiments to see if there could be partial matches. This was 
quite obviously the case with the files carved from the HardDriveEraser image. Enough text was recovered from 
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“00000026.htm” to perform a search of the dataset using the grep command. This returned a matching file that 
appeared to be the same: “I:\Dataset\Documents\ETEXT96\articles.html”.  However, the fact that the hashes had 
not found this match proved that the files could not be the same. Using the cmp command, it was possible to 
identify minor differences between the two files. The bytes at positions 95 and 96 had been changed from \x7274 
to \x0200. The same appeared to have occurred with the image file “00000000.gif” and “TOPWRAPPER.GIF”, 
shown in Table 5. The bytes had been changed in the exact same position, but to \x0400 instead of \x0200. The 
two files came from similar areas of the dataset (I:\Dataset\Documents\ETEXT96\ and 
I:\Dataset\Documents\IMAGES\), and all files were carved from the same general area of the image. The image 
comprised of 51 files: HardDriveEraser.001 to HardDriveEraser.051, with HardDriveEraser.003 being the only 
one that Scalpel carved any files from. The entire carved set comprised of 4 .gif files, 2 .jpgs, 7 .htm files, 3 .zip 
files and 18 .mpg files. The other image files were badly corrupted.  None of the .zip files or the .mpg files were 
valid (none could be opened), so no attempt at matching was made. Eventually, all 7 .htm files were paired with 
almost identical originals from the dataset. Long strings were taken from the carved files and the “grep” 
command was used to recursively search through the dataset. Each had been changed in particular positions in 
similar ways.  
In order to further investigate the erasing failings and the apparent overwriting pattern, the nonzero code was 
used, with some modification. Instead of looking at each byte of the image, the modified code (cmpblock.exe) 
looked for any sequences of the image that was not an exact copy of the 1KB block. Besides the source of the 
carved files, there was evidence of 8 further failings in the erasure. 8 of the non-matching sections had long 
sequences of ASCII text. Using the grep command it was possible to find the dataset file they came from (each 
came from a Project Gutenberg text file). There are two reasons why scalpel did not find this. The first is that 
only the middle sections of the texts were in the partially erased image. The second is that scalpel does not carve 
text files as they do not have a standard header/footer. 
 
Table 10 File carved from HardDriveEraser and original 
TOPWRAPPER.GIF (Original) 
 
00000000.gif (Carved) 
 
Original Carved 
  
  
  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In evaluating the merits of data erasers, the most important of criteria is simply the question “Did the program 
actually erase the data?” All other considerations are secondary to that. Of the 12 tools tested, 7 were shown to 
have failings in this regard. The most serious were BCWipe, Hard Drive Eraser and worst of all was Fileeraser 
with a total of 94 recovered files. The failings of the other four, DPWipe, Eraser, File Shredder and Freeraser 
were less significant. The same 6 files were recovered from each. While the failings of the former group could 
have been from anywhere in the dataset, the failings of the latter could only have been for files of relevance to 
the system. However, the average user that has to rely on complete erasure may not be aware of this possible 
blind spot. 
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The remaining 5 tools that correctly erased all traces of the dataset were all disk erasers. The minimum 
expectation of a file eraser is that the data for that specific file be overwritten, but there is also the consideration 
that no other data be affected. This may limit what the eraser can do without inadvertently corrupting other data. 
However, when an entire partition is chosen for erasure, all data can and must be destroyed. It allows for a wider 
range of techniques which are easier to implement.  
The consideration of the removal or obfuscation of file and directory names paints a similar picture. All disk 
erasing tools succeeded whereas only 2 of the 6 file erasers achieved the same. So while it is possible for a file 
eraser to successfully remove file and directory names, it is not trivial and not functionality that can be expected.  
 
# Tool Disk/File 
eraser 
Ability to 
erase System 
Volume 
Information 
Ability 
to 
erase 
all files 
Running 
Time 
(h:m) 
Memory 
Usage 
(average) 
CPU Usage 
(total 
h:m:s) 
1 Active @ KillDisk Disk Success Success 0:57 17,093 K 0:02:45 
2 BCWipe File Success Fail 21:51 819,054 K 1:13:57 
3 Blancco Disk Success Success 3:19 N/A N/A 
4 CBLDataShredder Disk Success Success 69:01 4,136 K 7:23:50 
5 DBAN Disk Success Success 3:57 N/A N/A 
6 DPWiper File Fail Success 5:00 7,984 K 0:56:11 
7 Eraser File Fail Success 8:20 43,095 K 1:35:04 
8 Fileeraser File Fail Fail 7:10 25,866 K 0:27:07 
9 FileShredder File Fail Success 7:41 64,915 K 5:31:43 
10 Freeraser File Fail Success 19:50 4,633 K 2:20:00 
11 HardDriveEraser Disk Success Fail 1:11 6,209 K 0:26:18 
12 Wipetool Disk Success Success 0:53 4,668 K 0:00:08 
Table 6 shows how the different programs compared in terms of running time, average memory usage and total 
CPU usage. There is considerable variation in the times taken and resources consumed. Some tools took in the 
region of one hour, others took days. The most notably resource-expensive tools were BCWipe with over 
800MB memory consumed, and CBLDataShredder, taking almost three days to run. There is considerable 
variation in the running time, which is unexpected given most tools were configured to perform the same number 
of overwrites (3). The ones that did not were Active @ Kill Disk, which was 1 pass, and WipeTool which did not 
state the number of passes (although the similar running time would suggest that it was also 1 pass). The speed at 
which HardDriveEraser completed (closer to the 1 pass Active @ Kill Disk than any of the 3 passes) would 
suggest the program did not operate as designed (a possible error occurred to cause it to behave erratically). 
Further investigation of this anomaly will be undertaken. 
Of the twelve tools analyzed, five are personal/non-profit projects (DBAN, DPWiper, FileEraser, FileShredder 
and HardDriveEraser) and the other seven are commercial products. Of the tools that completely erased all data 
from the drives, only one was non-commercial: DBAN. This might suggest that commercial products are more 
effective, but we believe this has more to do with the difference between disk and file erasers (there were only 
two non-commercial disk erasers: DBAN and HardDriverEraser). If one considers the tools from which arbitrary 
files were recovered, there was one commercial tool (BCWipe) as well as two non-commercial (FileEraser and 
HardDriveEraser). 
Recommendations 
From the experiments performed, we can make the following recommendations. For erasing entire drives, Active 
@ KillDisk and WipeTool performed the best. However, they did not implement the US DoD 5220.22-M(E) 
standard. If this is required (for compliance or personal preference), and a boot disk is feasible, Blancco and 
DBAN are recommended (CBLDataShredder was inefficient and HardDiskEraser did not wipe the drive).  
File erasers should not be used where there must be guarantees of data erasure, i.e. do not use a file eraser where 
whole disks need to be erased, but only where it is imperative that some files remain on the drive. Even then, it 
would be preferable to backup the required files, erase the disk with a disk eraser and restore the files. In the 
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event a file eraser must be used, DPWiper is recommended. Only those files that had been stored in the “System 
Volume Information” folder were recovered, and FTK was not able to retrieve the file/directory names. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented the rigorous method developed to test the features of various data erasing tools, as well 
as the results from our experiments. The number of failings was unexpectedly high. These tools give the 
impression that with multiple overwrites they will remove the data from all but the most sophisticated analysis. 
However, it was found that in several cases, data remains in plain view. 
The most obvious area of future work would be in the “System Volume Information” folder. Any user interested 
in protecting their privacy with a file eraser needs to be aware of what files are automatically stored in this 
location.  
Future experiments would benefit from the following: 
 Repeating the experiments on multiple disks  
 Increase the number of tools tested 
 The use of updated versions of previously tested tools 
 Automate a way to count how many file/directory names have been correctly recovered 
This work has highlighted some serious failings in existing data erasing tools. Users should be able to trust that 
files cannot be recovered once they have been erased. This research has shown which tools meet this 
fundamental requirement. 
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